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1. Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Introduction on Military Conscr iption 
 
Most economists favor an all-volunteer armed force to a conscripted one, based on the 
economic theory of comparative advantages. Many empirical studies in this field focus on the 
static efficiencies in terms of lifetime earnings associated with military conscription. For 
aggregate effects, Keller et al. (2009) show empirically that conscription has negative effects 
on both income levels and economic growth in OECD countries. The trend of abolishment of 
conscription in OECD countries, which started in the 1990s after the end of the Cold War, 
provides an opportunity to examine the debate between a conscripted and an all-volunteer 
armed force. According to theory, the conscription system ignores the comparative advantage 
of people who have to do the compulsory service, and may therefore distort the accumulation 
of their human and physical capital, which then depresses output and growth (Lau et al, 
2004). 
This thesis is largely inspired by the empirical work of Keller et al. (2009). I extend their 
sample to 2010, and include three additional relevant variables. First, is the conflict dummy 
variable, hoping to control for additional military determinants. Second, is the ratio of 
conscripts to the total armed force personnel, which is intended to capture some of the effects 
of the abolishment of conscription, and to examine whether the reduction in conscripts in the 
composition of the total armed force personnel has positive effects on economic performance 
as theory predicts. Third, is the ratio of armed force personnel to the labor force, included to 
examine the relationship between the size of the armed force personnel and economic 
performance. Furthermore, instead of running cross-country and panel regressions with 
averages from decades as in Keller et al., I run my panel regressions by year to obtain 
hopefully better estimates. 
The estimates obtained in the thesis are not always in line with what the theory predicts. 
For example, the share of conscripts in the armed personnel is only estimated to have negative 
effects on GDP per unit of the labor force when inflation and fixed effects are not accounted 
for (A 10% increase in this share variable decreases GDP per labor force by 0.098%, holding 
all else constant.) As for its effect on economic growth, measured by the GDP per capita 
growth rate, it also only has negative and significant effects when not controlling for inflation 
and fixed effects. Without further specifications, a 10% increase in the share of conscripts to 
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the armed force reduces GDP per capita growth rate by 0.0595%, ceteris paribus. When 
country and year fixed effects are added, the coefficient estimates of this variable on income 
and growth become positive and significant.  
When fixed effects are added, all conscription variables have a surprisingly mostly 
positive effect on both income levels and growth rates, which cannot be explained solely by 
the mainstream theory. The results imply that the negative effect of conscription on economic 
performance is not robust to fixed effects. 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: the next section reports further background 
information on military conscription, followed by the literature review on conscription in 
section two, which tends to be divided into three types of costs: static, dynamic, and other 
economic costs. The section after describes the model and data used for estimation, which is 
an augmented Solow growth model, following the tradition of Keller et al (2009). The fourth 
section presents the results, which are surprisingly somewhat different than the findings of 
Keller et al (2009). I also provide interpretations of these results. Sensitivity tests are also 
reported in this section. The fifth section concludes. 
 
1.2 Further Background 
 
What is military conscr iption? 
Military conscription, or the military draft has been the main source of armed force 
personnel recruitment for most countries throughout history. Almost all countries in the world 
have military manpower (except Iceland). Instead of military conscription, a government can 
also rely on an all-volunteer force, or a combination of both compulsory and voluntary 
recruitment systems.  
Throughout time, conscripted soldiers have been the dominant source of military 
manpower. Both World Wars were fought with conscripts. For the government, the 
conscription system is cheaper to finance than an all-volunteer force. The choice between the 
two systems is likely to depend on the government’s ability to tax, either by levying an in-
kind tax on conscripts, or monetary tax to hire and keep professional soldiers.  
Both the volume and duration of conscription are sizable. Almost all young male citizens 
who are deemed to be able-bodied are subject to conscription (Israel being a special case of 
recruiting also female conscripts), and the length of compulsory military service was by and 
large over 1.5 years in the past. Given the compulsory nature of conscription, its volume and 
duration, it is of interest for economists to find out whether and to what extent conscription 
has an influence on economic performance. 
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Some recent development in the military sector : 
While the tradition of keeping a conscripted armed force remains in most parts of the 
world (countries marked in red in Figure 1 below), and for most OECD countries until the 
mid 1990s, there have been significant developments in the functioning of the military in the 
recent past. The progress in developing modern weaponry, information technology such as the 
advent of the internet, the fall of communism, and military adventurism, etc., all make the 
military sector less labor-intensive and require more professional skills. This trend towards 
more specialized armed force personnel can be seen in OECD countries. The United Kingdom 
abolished conscription in 1960, followed by Luxembourg in 1967, and the United States in 
1973. In 1985, just eight out of 22 OECD countries that had a population over one million 
still used conscription. After the end of the Cold War, most western European countries 
started to abolish or phase out conscription, as Figure 2 shows. In Figure 3, one can see the 
trend towards abolishment of conscription in a sample of 21 OECD countries1. Each dot in 
Figure 3 represents the (unweighted) average percentage of conscripts in total armed 
personnel in these 21 OECD countries. Since 1990, and the end of the Cold War, there is a 
constant decrease in the ratio of conscripts to total armed personnel.  
 
 
Figure 1: Military Recruitment Around The World, 2011 
 
Source: Wagener and Poutvaara, Ending Military Conscription, 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
  8 
 
Figure 2: Military Recruitment in Europe 
 
 
Source: Wagener and Poutvaara, EndinngMilitary Conscription, 2011 
 
 
Figure 3: Unweighted Ratio of Conscripts to Total Armed Force Personnel  
 
 
1 These are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and 
the United States of America. Source: own calculations 
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From Poutaara and Wagener’s (2011) research finding, one can see in Figure 4 below that 
aside for different starting levels, military expenditures from 1985 to 2009 do not vary much 
for conscription countries (Denmark, Germany, Greece, Norway, and Turkey) and countries 
that abolished conscription (Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) in 
early 1990s. There seems to be no clear correlation between use of conscription and military 
expenditure. However, countries that still use conscription seem to afford larger military 
budgets. Figure 5 shows quite unsurprisingly, that conscription countries have the highest 
percentage of armed personnel in the labor force. The reduction in armed personnel in the 
total labor force is to be seen for all country groups from 2000, and the reduction is largest for 
the conscription country group. This might indicate the problem of unfair selection in 
conscription system, and/or that more young people who are subject to conscription were 
willing and able to serve in alternative service. Surprisingly, the abolishment of conscription 
does not seem to reduce military budgets nor army size in relative terms. 
 
 
Figure 4: Defense Expenditure of ‘Old’ Nato Members 
 
Source: Wagener and Poutvaara, Ending Military Conscription, 2011 
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Figure 5- Military and Civilian Personnel In The Armed Forces of ‘Old’ Nato Members 
 
Source: Wagener and Poutvaara, Ending Military Conscription, 2011 
 
 
 
      Conscription and alternative service: 
The quality difference between conscripted soldiers and professional soldiers is expected 
to be significant. Conscripted soldiers have shorter periods of training, less on-the-field 
experience, and high turnover rates. Moreover, conscripts are paid less than same-rank 
professionals, and do not enjoy the same perks for veterans and (retired) professionals, who 
might enjoy a higher interest rate in saving, better health insurance, discounts on grocery, etc. 
Since most conscripts do not seek a professional soldier career after their forced service time, 
it should be assumed that their military productivity is lower due to lack of skills, experience, 
incentives and motivation. There is unfortunately very little data on whether conscripts were 
actually sent to fields of real wars, except in the case of Australia and the United States of 
America during the first years of the Vietnam War 
As a corollary to conscription, most democratic countries offer alternative service to 
conscientious objectors. Unfortunately, there is not enough data on the volume and duration 
of alternative service for a cross-country empirical analysis. One should bear in mind that 
alternative service has economic costs too, such as setting up screening-commission panels, 
and other bureaucratic burdens.  The length of alternative service is usually longer than that 
for military service. From the little data available, Denmark is the only country that has the 
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same length of service, 4 months, for both alternative and compulsory military service. 
Austria has a longer length of alternative service, which is systematically 50% longer than 
normal military service. (8 months for Zivildienst, or alternative service as in 2011), Greece is 
also punitive in alternative service length, 15 months as in 2011 which is about two-thrids 
longer than normal military service time. Most punitive is Finland, which has a 100% longer 
spell in alternative service (12 months) than in military service (6 months). People in 
alternative service usually work in civilian and social sectors, and some argue that it provides 
valuable social benefits at lower budgetary costs.  
 
Conscription and Efficiency Loss: 
The main arguments against conscription are focused on the mismatch in comparative 
advantages. Adam Smith (1976 [1776]: 701) provides a clear intuition against conscription 
and found an ‘irresistible superiority which a well-regulated standing army has over a militia’. 
In other words he preferred a professional armed force to conscription. A conscription system 
ignores the differences in comparative advantages and productivity, and assigns all conscripts 
to similar tasks for the same output. This mismatch is inefficient and adds further opportunity 
costs, and should lead to output loss compared to an all-volunteer armed force. From 
conscripts’ point of view, the opportunity cost of serving in the army is likely to be larger than 
their willingness-to-pay to avoid the draft. The missed opportunity can be, for example, 
postponed/disturbed continuation of education, training, on the job experience and earnings. 
Switzerland is the only country in the world that actually accepts monetary payments in order 
not to serve in conscription (the exemption fee is 3% of annual income tax until the age of 
30).  
Few economists are in favor of conscription, but their arguments are also centered around 
comparative advantage. Lee and McKenzie (1992) and Warner and Ash (1995) argue that 
conscription can be socially more costly than professional army if the latter’s budgetary costs 
are financed through high and distortionary taxes. Most other economists, such as Hansen and 
Weisbrod (1967), Oi (1967), Fisher (1969), Poutvaara and Wagener (2005), do see potential 
in efficiency loss in conscription due to the mismatch in comparative advantages and 
productivity. The efficiency loss ranges from static dead-weight loss to long-term distortions 
in output. The same logic of efficiency loss also applies to alternative service given its 
compulsory nature.  
In terms of the effects of conscription on real output, Hansen and Weisbrod (1967) 
provide estimates of monetary cost of conscripted soldiers to the United States. Some other 
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static costs estimates for other countries are reported in the literature review, in the section 
2.2.1. For the dynamic, long term effects, Lau et al (2004) provide computational equilibrium 
simulations, which show that the long-term GDP can be depressed by up to 1%, if the whole 
population is subject to conscription (or to any similar form of compulsory service). 
The work of Keller, Poutvaara, and Wagener (2009) is the first large-scale empirical work 
testing the hypothesis that in the long run, military conscription hampers economic 
performance. They examine 21 OECD countries (same country sample as in Figure 3) from 
1960-2000 and find negative and significant effects of conscription on both income levels and 
growth. So far it is the only work that empirically studies the long-run effects of military 
conscription on economic performance at the macroeconomic level. 
This thesis extends the work of Keller et al. to 2010, uses panel data by year, and adds few 
new variables. The results are surprisingly quite different. Most important finding is probably 
that the expected negative effects of conscription seem not to exist, when fixed effects are 
being controlled for. 
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2. L iterature Review 
 
 
2.1 Theoretical Studies 
 
The choice between a professional and a conscripted army was debated in the 18th century 
by Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant. Kant states in the third preliminary article of Perpetual 
Peace (1795) that “Standing armies (miles perpetuus) shall in time be totally abolished” 
because they are themselves “a cause of offensive war.” In other words, Kant argues that a 
perpetual standing army (mercenary soldiers) is the source of potential conflicts. Of course 
there is a difference between Kant’s ‘standing armies’ and the modern professional, voluntary 
soldiers. Kant’s standing armies might have referred to foreign mercenary soldiers during the 
medieval periods, or for example, the German Hessians hired by the British to fight the 
rebellious American colonists during the War of Independence. Curtis (1982) points out this 
important difference in the definition: ‘Mercenary soldiers hired for service in an army not of 
their own country are not the same as a modern, volunteer army—that is, one in which 
citizens choose to serve in their country’s armed forces.’ James and Choi (2003) provide 
empirical results that contradict Kant’s view on military manpower system: for the period 
from 1886 to 1992, they show that conscripted soldiers are significantly connected to more 
militarized interstate disputes than professional soldiers. 
Adam Smith shows his preference for professional soldiers over conscripts in terms of 
economic interest. He finds ‘irresistible superiority which a well-regulated standing army 
(professional soldiers) has over a militia (conscripts)’ (1776). The main arguments against 
conscription from Smith and most other economists are focused on the comparative advantage 
and benefits from specialization. People have different skills and are good at different tasks, 
this implies that not everyone is a good soldier. The skills, experience and expertise (in 
handling complex weaponry, for example) required for a good soldier are harder for 
conscripts to achieve given their shorter periods of service, high turnover rates, and perhaps 
most importantly, lack of motivation. Therefore, the labor productivity of conscripts should be 
lower than professional soldiers.  A society that relies on conscription would have to forgo the 
productivity gains from a professionalized army in terms of military output (perhaps in the 
form of ‘peace-dividend’ from crisis-averting and peace-keeping functions, as argued by 
Knight et al. 1996), and bear the opportunity costs from the mismatch of comparative 
advantages among conscripts. Poutvaara and Wagener (2007) provide interesting analogy of 
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this mismatch, ‘Forcing everybody to serve in the military is no more sensible than forcing all 
citizens to work as nurses, heart surgeons, or teachers.’ 
Little had been said on this debate since the comments of these two individuals until the 
escalation of the Vietnam War in 1966. Over the next five years, together with public debates, 
economists produced a substantial volume of research on the feasibility and efficiency of an 
all-volunteer armed force. Major contributors include Walter Y. Oi (1967), Hansen and 
Weisbrod (1967), Altman and Fechter (1967), Friedman (1967), Fisher (1969), and Altman 
and Barro (1971). With Friedman on the board of the Gates Commission, which was 
established by Richard Nixon, conscription was abolished in the United States in 1970 
following a unanimous recommendation of the board members.  
Among academics who are not in favor of conscription Hansen and Weisbrod (1967), 
Warner and Ash (2001), Poutvaara and Wagener (2007), and Pfaffenzeller (2009) recognize 
and summarize the distributive and allocative effects of conscription on real gross national 
product. Given the compulsive nature of conscription, there has to be some sort of selection 
procedure (at least for the United States), that creates uncertainty for ‘draftable’ young men 
and their employers, and a possible selection bias which can be an issue of fairness. The 
apparent cheapness of draftee labor means a below market wage, and would imply more 
enlistment than necessary, leading to an excessive personnel-capital ratio in conscript armies. 
Furthermore, the opportunity costs for the conscripts exceed the fiscal costs by the maximum 
amount draftees are willing to pay to avoid compulsory service. These costs can be measured 
by the difference between the conscripts’ below market wage income in the military and the 
potential market income if they were not forced to serve. One also needs to note that the 
pecuniary disutility includes also the extra risk of death or injury that military service may 
entail. 
Not all economists are in favor of an all-volunteer force. Lee and McKenzie (1992) and 
Warner and Ash (1995) argue that under certain circumstances, an all-volunteer force is not 
feasible, for example due to aging and changing demography, or it could be more efficient 
than conscription if all-volunteer military forces are financed through high and distortionary 
taxes. Ng (2008) offers an alternative view opposed to almost unanimous preference for an all 
volunteer force among economists, and argues that the desirability of conscription cannot be 
completely excluded if the returns in military service are high (due to both training costs and 
learning by doing), and the required amount of military service is high (such as for a country 
at war). 
With significant technological development in the military sector, and the end of the Cold 
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War, many European countries started to consider ending conscription. The all-volunteer 
example set by the United States and the United Kingdom do seem to play a role in the 
decision makings of European governments. Warner and Negrusa (2005) examine the 
conversion from conscription to a more volunteer force in the European countries with the 
extended theory of military manpower procurement system choice (Warner and Ash, 1996). 
Warner and Negrusa (2005) add the social costs of individuals’ attempts to evade conscription 
and the government’s cost of preventing it in the military manpower procurement model, and 
interpret their research results as that the higher these evasion costs are, the more likely that a 
government converts to an all volunteer military manpower. Warner and Negrusa (2005) find 
the decisions of many European countries to end conscription efficient and equitable. With 
the changing roles and missions of European militaries and the post Cold War downsizing, 
they argue that volunteer forces have lower real resource costs than conscripted forces.  
A further branch of research focuses on why some countries use conscription while some 
do not. Mulligan and Shleifer (2004) find that countries with a higher population tend to use 
conscription more (holding the relative size of military constant). They also find that countries 
with a French legal origin, which they see as those facing lower fixed and variable 
administrative costs, are more likely to use conscription than countries with common law 
origins. Furthermore, they find that conscription does not seem to be influenced by 
democracy, but rather by the deadweight costs of taxation only in countries with very large 
militaries. They conclude that the fixed costs of introducing and administering new 
regulations may be an important determinant of the use of conscription.  
Anderson, Halcoussis and Tollison (1996) argue that the strength and extent of the labor 
unions may be a determinant in government’s choice of military procurement. They 
hypothesize that unions may expect to benefit from conscription in the same way that they 
prefer minimum wages. Both devices are meant to protect the lower skilled, younger members 
of the union. They find that in countries where the influence of labor unions is high the more 
likely it is to use military conscription. 
Poutvaara and Wagener (2007) discuss Pareto efficiency in the abolishment of military 
draft as a form of intergenerational redistribution. They argue that introducing military 
conscription benefits the older generation while it harms the young and all future generations. 
In their view, military conscription distorts human capital formation more severely than an 
intergenerational transfer using public debt or pay-as-you-go pensions, therefore it can be 
abolished in a Pareto-improving way if age-dependent taxes are available. More specifically, 
they argue that the political allure to keep military conscription can be explained with the 
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absence of age-specific taxation. 
 
2.2 Empirical Studies 
 
The empirical work in the filed of military conscription focus largely on efficiency losses. 
I find that this research tends to be divided into three types of costs: 
 1. Static Costs: efficiency loss measured in terms of income (usually life-time earning 
or budgetary costs comparisons for a certain country in a certain period) 
 2. Dynamic: the effects of conscription through the channels of education and human 
capital accumulation. The dynamic costs tend to account for the indirect effects of 
conscription through human capital accumulation on economic performance, which provides 
framework for estimating the effects on military conscription 
 3. Other economic costs: for example social costs, which are hard to be measured, for 
example the evasion costs of conscription (e.g. costs in emigration, pretended schooling, 
bribing recruitment officers, faking medical records, etc.) 
 
2.2.1 Static Cost of Military Conscription 
 
Hansen and Weibrod (1967) are the pioneers in modeling the static costs of military 
conscription. Their theoretical model of implicit income taxes on eligible draftees is focused 
specifically on the allocative and distributive effects of conscription on real output, and on 
finding numerical values of such costs for the United States. The annual total distributive cost 
equals up to $990 million and the annual allocative cost equals up to $1120 millions. On the 
individual level, the difference in annual net forgone income (annual civilian income 
opportunities minus annual actual military compensation) equals $1480. 
 
Angrist (1989) compares the lifetime earnings of the Vietnam War veterans and non-
veteran. He uses instrumental variables estimates from the Social Security Administration 
records, and finds that in the early 1980s, the earnings of white veterans are approximately 
15% less than non-veteran earnings. In an attempt to explain this loss of earnings to veterans, 
Angrist estimates the experience-earnings profiles jointly with time-varying veteran status 
coefficients. His estimates suggest that the effect of Vietnam era military conscription on 
white veterans is equivalent to a loss of two years of civilian labor market experience. 
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Bauer and Schmidt (2009) identify the causal effect of military conscription on conscripts’ 
subsequent labor market outcomes in Germany during the 1950s with the regression-
discontinuity design. Using the White Cohort (Weißer Jahrgang) as a control group (German 
and Austrian men who were born between 1929 and 1937, and exempted from compulsory 
military service), they find that people that served in conscription earn comparatively more, 
yet the earnings advantage and wage premium of those who serve in the armed forces vanish 
when the selection effects are taken into account. The observed earnings differentials could 
entirely be attributed to the way the conscripts are selected. They argue that healthier men are 
likely to contribute a better labor market outcome than their rejected or exempted counterparts 
(selection effect), and therefore ‘it would be reasonable to say that conscripts would have 
earned more even without serving in the Bundeswehr.’ 
 
Imbens and Klaauw (1995) report the earning differentials between men who were 
selected to serve in conscription and those who were not in the Netherlands. They point out 
the complicated examination process of the selection in to the military draft, and numerous 
(temporary) exemptions that can be manipulated by young men to avoid military service. 
They find that approximately after 10 years of serving in the Dutch military (1989/1990), 
former conscripts earn on average 5% less than the members of their birth cohort who did not 
serve in the military.  Furthermore, a comparison of this cost with the returns to one year of 
work experience indicates that serving in the military is roughly equivalent to the cost of 
losing one year of potential work experience.  
 
Kunze (2002) explores the short and long run effects of career interruptions on (accepted) 
wages for young skilled workers in West Germany. Beside military conscription, the analysis 
includes three other types of career interruptions: unemployment, parental leave for female 
workers, and other non-work spells. For interruptions due to military conscription, Kunze 
finds that conscripted men earn 3.2% more in wage income during the first year after service 
term, but earn less afterwards than the non-conscripted men, and the gap in wages increases 
with time.  
 
In terms of comparison with budgetary costs, Lutz (1996) finds that the annual 
monetarized utility loss from conscription equals 9-27% of the German defense expenditure.  
Kerstens and Meyermans (1993) estimate the social costs of the selective conscription in 
Belgium to be twice as large as its budgetary costs. They point out the complicated 
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examination process of the selection in to the military draft, and numerous (temporary) 
exemptions that can be manipulated by young men to avoid the draft. 
 
2.2.2 Dynamic Costs 
 
Lau et al. (2002) argue that conscription distorts output via two channels. The first 
channel is human capital accumulation. Young people (usually men) have to disrupt/postpone 
education or labor market experience. They argue that the time spent in compulsory military 
service depreciates their human capital, i.e., the knowledge and skills they gain from 
secondary education would be more or less lost during the service time. Hence the time gap 
dedicated to conscription interrupts and distorts the human capital accumulation and thus 
might reduce labor productivity. The lifetime earning research, e.g. the work of Kunze (2002) 
corroborates this. 
The second channel is through capital accumulation. They share the view of conscription 
as form of in-kind tax as in Weisbrod et. Al (1967), and further suggest that this front-loaded 
in-kind tax is levied more one-sidededly on young people than ‘normal monetary’ taxation on 
general population to finance public expenditure.  
To estimate the dynamic costs of conscription and other similar types of disruptions in 
human capital accumulation (such as alternative civilian service) via these two channels, they 
provide a dynamic general equilibrium model and computational simulations of steady-state 
output, with respect to the extent of conscription and taxation. Their findings suggest that 
conscription decreases output by 0.2% to 1% from its original steady-state.  
Wagener and Keller (2009) hypothesize that military draft discourages demand for higher 
education. Using data from 1960-2000 for OECD countries, they find empirically that the 
scale and extent of conscription, measured in the share of conscripts to the labor force, and the 
duration of service time, do have significant negative effects on tertiary education enrollment 
rates.  
The first large scale empirical work on the effect of conscription on economic 
performance is from Keller et al. (2009). Using an augmented Solow growth model and data 
from OECD countries from 1960-2000, they find that conscription and alternative service 
have negative and significant effects on income levels and economic growth. 
 
 
2.2.3 Other Economic Cost  
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  While the real social costs of conscription can hardly be measured, some empirical work 
does provide a useful insight. Bauer et al. (2011) focus on conscription in Germany, which 
was introduced in 1956 and where young men were able to postpone military service if they 
enrolled in universities. They argue that young men are drafted typically when they are at the 
height of their learning ability, and in order to continue their human capital accumulation in 
the hope for higher returns from civilian labor market later and also to avoid the draft, the 
demand for tertiary education might increase. Consistent with this, they find that conscription 
leads to an increase in the probability of having a university degree in Germany.  
  
   Galiani et al. (2006) provide relationships between conscription and crime. They find that 
the initiation in criminal activities is typically a ‘young’ phenomenon and argue that 
conscription, being one of the major events affecting the young, may have some causal effects 
on crime. Using data from Argentina, where selective conscription exists, they find that 
participation in military service increases the likelihood of developing a criminal record 
(particularly for property and weapon-related crimes) in adulthood. 
  Vasquez (2005) studies the relationship between conscription and military casualties. He 
finds that democracies with conscript armies experience fewer combat casualties than 
democracies with volunteer or professional forces, and argues that this is because societal 
actors most closely affected by conscript casualties are more likely to have the political power 
and access with which to constrain policy makers. Poutvaara and Wagener (2011) see the idea 
of conscription being more ‘representative’ of society in the military sector as a myth, because 
conscription covers less than half of the population and often excludes women, homosexuals, 
fathers and some religious groups. They argue that a conscript armed force is de facto biased 
in terms of the selection process, which includes legal and illegal buyout options. 
 
   Debates on links between conscription and the representativeness of the population, peace-
keeping, and democracy are still open. Choi and James (2003) study the violent interstate 
conflicts from 1886 to 1992 and find that conscript armies are associated with more military 
disputes than a military manpower system with professional or voluntary forces. Anderson et 
al. (1996) conclude that war-like states are more likely to rely on conscription. Pfaffenzeller 
(2009) finds no empirical link between democracy and conscription, and finds conscription 
unnecessary in countries without threat. 
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3. Model and Data 
 
3.1 The Augmented Solow Model 
 
Following the work of Keller et al. (2009), the model used to estimate the income and 
growth effects of military conscription is an augmented Solow growth model. The production 
function can be written as: 
Y(t)=A(t,m)K(t)!H(t) " L(t)1-!-" 
  
      !, ", 1-!-">0, i.e. all inputs receive a positive factor share. For year t, Y(t) denotes the 
gross domestic product, K(t) represents the amount of physical capital, L(t) represents non-
augmented labor employed in production, and H(t) denotes human capital. The variable 
A(t,m) measures total factor productivity, which depends on m, a vector of military variables. 
 As in Mankiw et al. (1992), the labor force grows at an constant and exogenous rate n, 
and technology grows at a constant rate g. The economy is assumed to be on a balanced 
growth path, where constant shares sk and sh of GDP are devoted to investments in physical 
and human capital. By assuming an equal depreciation rate # for both human and physical 
capital, one obtains: 
 
                       (1) 
 
This framework can be used to evaluate essentially any growth model that admits a 
balanced growth path, including endogenous growth models, as argued by Bernake and 
Gürkaynak (2001). A similar Solow-type approach was used by Knight et al. (1996) to test for 
the impact of military spending on economic growth.  
In order to estimate the growth of per capita GDP, following Mankiw et al. (1992) and 
Keller et al. (2009), one can approximate equation (1) by a Taylor expansion around the 
steady state and solve the resulting differential equation, which results in: 
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                                  (2) 
where  is the rate of convergence. 
 
 
3.2 Data 
 
In the analysis that follows I use the same 21 OECD countries for my sample, and extend 
the period one decade further. The vector m in the augmented Solow model mentioned above, 
is a assumed to be a vector of the following military variables: 
 
Conscript Dummy Variable: this takes the value one if a country uses conscription ( in a 
particular year). During transition time, when conscription is being abolished de jure but not 
de facto, the variable also takes the value one, as long as the number of conscripts is positive.  
 
 Conscripts/A rmed Personnel is the ratio of conscripts to total armed personnel. If a 
country does not have any conscripts, the value is zero. As seen in Figure 3, there is a clear 
trend of decreasing shares of conscripts to total armed force in those 21 OECD countries since 
1990. This control variable should indicate the effect of the composition of the armed force on 
economic performance, i.e. whether a larger share of conscripts depresses economic 
performance, or in other words, whether a more professionalized armed force is better for the 
economy.  
 
Conscripts/Labor Force is the ratio of conscripts to the total labor force. This should 
measure the effect of the scope of conscription in the labor force. If conscription indeed 
hampers economic performance, then the larger the share of the conscripts to the labor force, 
the larger the negative effect it should have on income levels and growth. 
 
A rmed Force Personnel/Labor Force is the ratio of total armed force personnel to total 
labor force, i.e. the relative size of the armed force to the total labor force. It is a more general 
military variable, and should indicate the effect of the relative size of armed force. 
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Length of Conscription is the length of conscription measured in months.  If the lengths 
of conscription vary among military branches, army, navy, and air force, the length is 
calculated as the weighted average of the service lengths from each branch, with respect to the 
composition of conscripts in each branch. If the composition of conscripts in each branch is 
unknown, and the lengths of conscription do vary among branches, the length of conscription 
is calculated as the weighted average of the of service lengths from each branch, assuming 
that conscripts are distributed identically as army, navy and air force in total armed force 
personnel. The value of length  of conscription takes the value zero if a country does not use 
conscription. 
 
Keller et al. (2009) include the lengths of alternative as a regressor. However, following 
the same source (WRI, EBCO, and OMHROI), I find that there is unfortunately no time series 
data on the lengths of alternative service, and so it is dropped from my estimations. The value 
of length of conscription takes the value zero if a country does not use conscription. 
 
The conscript dummy variable, the numbers of conscripts and the total armed force are 
from the Military Balance of IISS (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London). 
To capture military environment, such as whether a country deploys armed force to 
national or international conflicts, and how much a country spends in military expenditure, I 
include the following two variables. 
 
Conflict: is a dummy variable taking the value one if a country is involved in armed 
conflict(s) in that year, as defined by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP, 2011)  ‘a 
contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed 
force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 
25 battle-related deaths’. The data are taken from UCDP and the International Peace Research 
Institute (PRIO, Oslo, 2011). Conflicts are for example the Vietnam War, Invasion of the 
Falkland Island, the war against terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
 
Military Expenditure/G DP is the ratio of military/defense expenditure to GDP, which is 
taken from the World Development Indicators (2010) database of the World Bank. In the 
literature of defense economics, there is usually mixed results of the estimated ceteris paribus 
effects of this variable on economic growth (Frederiksen, 1983). Some say that it has no 
effect, such as Denne et al. (2004), and some say it has negative effects on growth (Knight et 
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al. 1996). Despite the findings that the relationship between defense spending with economic 
performance might be non-linear, as Heo (1998), Hooker and Knetter (1997) and Stroup and 
Heckelmann (2001) argue, I include this variable in my simple linear regression models, 
mostly because of the supposedly homogeneity in the OECD countries, and also following the 
conscription regression models by Keller et al. (2009). 
 
Other non military variables, GDP, GDP per capita growth rate, labor force, investment 
proxy (gross capital composition as % of GDP), inflation rates, and population growth rates, 
are taken from the World Development Indicators (2010) databases of the World Bank.  
I use basically the same data source as Keller et al. (2009), with exceptions of Population, 
and Education. Keller et al. (2009) use working-age population as a proxy for Population, 
whereas I use the total labor force. For Education, they use the average shares of the 
working-age population that is in secondary education, while I use the average years of 
secondary education from Barro and Lee (Educational Attainment for Aged 15 and Over, 
2010). The missing values in the four-year gaps from Barro and Lee are calculated assuming 
that the changes in the average years of secondary education between each period change at 
the same rate. Since there is so far no convention in choosing a proxy for human capital, as 
discussed by Sianesi and Van Reenen (1992) and that there is essentially more data available 
from Barro and Lee (average school years) than with the data used by Keller et al. (2009), I 
use the education proxy from Barro and Lee.  
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Summary Statistics: 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (Means of Variables of Interest) 
 
 Without 
Conscription 
With Conscription All Countries 
Conscripts /Armed 
Personnel 
0 57.6% 32.5% 
Conscripts/ Labor 
Force 
0 0.1% 0.5% 
Armed 
Personnel/Labor 
Force 
0.75% 16.3% 12.7% 
Length 0 13.508 months 8.488 months 
Conflict 0.361 0.223 0.272 
Military 
Expenditure /GDP  
1.854% 2.051% 1.964% 
Investment/GDP 22.4% 23.2% 22.9% 
Population Growth 
Rate+ 0.05 
0.059% 0.057% 0.058% 
Education 
(secondary School 
Year) 
3.621 years 2.562 years 2.935 years 
Inflation Rate 4.2% 7.2% 6.2% 
GDP/Labor Force 45309.25 39280.38 41749.35 
GDP per capita 
Growth Rate 
1.83% 2.27% 2.11% 
 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the major variables in the dataset. For those 
observations where countries use conscription, the average ratio of armed personnel to the 
total labor force (16.3%) is much larger than that for the group without conscription (0.75%). 
Average military expenditure as a percentage in GDP is also higher for observations with 
conscription. On average 2.05% of GDP is spent on the military sector for observations with 
conscription, whereas observations without conscription spend less than 1.9% of GDP for 
military sector. The average investment ratio to GDP is slightly larger in countries with 
conscription. However, these differences may not be significantly different. 
 
In terms of other variables, population growth is slightly larger and average years of 
secondary education is more than one year higher for countries that do not use conscription, 
results which are consistent with the findings of Keller et al. (2009). Interestingly, the 
observations without conscription have more conflicts on average. Income levels as measured 
in GDP by per unit of the labor force are higher on average in the observations that do not use 
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conscription, and the corresponding GDP per capita growth rate is lower. 
The average inflation rate is higher in the sample of countries that use conscription. Keller 
et al. (2009) argue that higher inflation indicates the weaker ability of the government to tax, 
thus the government is more likely to use conscription as the main source to recruit military 
staff.  Therefore I report in Table 2 the correlations (along with significance levels) between 
inflation and military variables.  Inflation is indeed significantly positively correlated with all 
the military variables, with the highest correlation being with the ratio of conscripts to the 
labor force. The ratio of military expenditure to GDP is also positively and significantly 
correlated with all the military variables, and highest with respect to the ratio of total armed 
forces to the labor force. Conflict is negatively correlated with all the military variables, 
although not always significantly. It seems that countries with higher inflation rates rely more 
on conscription, and that countries which are involved in more conflicts rely more on 
professional soldiers. 
 
Table 2: Correlation and Significance  
 
 Inflation Military 
Expenditure/GDP 
Conflict 
Conscription DV 0.172 *** 0.105 ** -0.1475 *** 
Conscripts/Total 
Armed Personnel 
0.331 *** 0.154 ** -0.1869*** 
Conscripts/Labor 
Force 
0.593 *** 0.422 *** -0.05 
Total Armed 
Personnel/Labor 
Force 
0.547 *** 0.596 *** -0.054 
Length 0.293 *** 0.298 *** -0.064 * 
Note: *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively 
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4. Results 
 
 
When estimating equation (1) and (2), I extend the augmented growth model of Mankiw 
et al. (1992) by adding six military variables, measuring the use of conscription and the 
relative size of military expenditure to GDP. The variable Military Expenditure/GDP is added 
to the conscription variables because it very likely affects the choice of military recruitment, 
i.e the size and composition of the military force. Instead of using military expenditure/GDP 
as an additional control variable as in Keller et al. (2009) in most of their estimations, I 
include it as one of the military variables to avoid potential multicollinearity problems. 
Inflation and Conflict are added as additional control variables, as the inflation rate has 
often been shown to negatively affect economic growth (Barro (1996), Fountas et al. (2001)), 
and conflicts are likely to be the cause of demand for military output. 
For both the income and growth estimations, I first report the regression results without 
any military variable for the sake of comparison, before reporting results when adding 
military variables one by one. This setup is then repeated for both income and growth 
estimations in the following four specifications, each including more control variables: 
 
Specification I:  Investment, Population Growth, Education, as in the model of Mankiw et 
al. (1992) )+ Conflict 
Specification II: Specification I+ Inflation Rates 
Specification III: Specification II+ Country Fixed Effects 
Specification IV: Specification III+ Year Fixed Effects 
 
    Note that all the ratio variables, and GDP per capita growth rates are multiplied by 100, for 
easier numerical interpretation 
 
4.1 Income Levels 
 
Table 3 reports OLS regression results for income levels under Specification I. The 
coefficients on population growth and education receive the expected signs, i.e. population 
growth has negative and education has positive effects on the level of income. In addition, the 
estimated coefficients of population growth rate and education are all significant from column 
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(1) to (7). The coefficient on investment, on the other hand, does not always receive the 
expected positive sign, for example in column (5) and (7). It is strange that the coefficients of 
investment change so much when military variables are added. The coefficients on conflict 
are always positive (although insignificant) in Table 3.  
 From column (2) to (7), one can see that enforcing military conscription depresses 
income, and all the estimates of military variables are negative and significant, holding all 
else constant. By having a conscription system, income per member of the labor force is 
depressed by 0.06% ceteris-paribus. In terms of the effects of military staff composition, as 
shown in column (3), the higher the percentage of conscripts to the total armed force the 
lower is income per member of the labor force (all else equal). Based on the estimated 
coefficient in column (3) and ceteris paribus assumption, if the total armed force personnel is 
staffed equally by conscripts and professionals, the income per labor force is depressed by 
about 0.045%; and if the armed force personnel is entirely consisted of conscripts, income per 
labor force is depressed by 0.09%. A one month increase in the spell of conscription duration 
depresses income per unit of the labor force by 0.01% (holding all else constant). 
In column (4), the coefficient on the ratio of conscripts to the labor force indicates that if  
10% of the labor force is forced to serve in conscription, income per unit of the labor force is 
depressed by 1.31% (holding all else constant). To see the effects of the total military 
personnel and expenditure on income, one can look at the estimates of Armed Force 
Personnel/Labor Force and Military Expenditure/GDP as in column (5) and (7). Holding all 
else constant, if 10% of the total labor force works in the military sector, income per labor 
force is depressed by 1.29%; and a 10% increase in military expenditure to GDP  depresses 
income per labor force by 0.009%.
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T
able 3: Incom
e L
evels under S
pecification I 
 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
Investm
ent 
0.00202 
0.00216 
0.00231 
0.00196 
-0.000425 
0.00227 
-0.1018** 
 
(0.00329) 
(0.00320) 
(0.00324) 
(0.00314) 
(0.00304) 
(0.00304) 
(0.00435) 
P
opulation G
row
th +
0.05 
-0.3479*** 
-0.362*** 
-0.353*** 
-0.3201*** 
-0.325*** 
-0.3581*** 
-0.2793*** 
 
(0.02959) 
(0.02946) 
(0.02865) 
(0.02719) 
(0.02723) 
(0.02754) 
(0.03.721) 
E
ducation 
0.312*** 
0.302*** 
0.301*** 
0.260*** 
0.259*** 
0.280*** 
0.291*** 
 
(0.0111) 
(0.0122) 
(0.0123) 
(0.0136) 
(0.0128) 
(0.0128) 
(0.0155) 
C
onflict 
0.0326 
0.0258 
0.0217 
0.0136 
0.0138 
0.0210 
0.00882 
 
(0.0254) 
(0.0257) 
(0.0256) 
(0.0237) 
(0.0233) 
(0.0251) 
(0.0281) 
C
onscript D
V
 
 
-0.0614** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.0271) 
 
 
 
 
 
C
onscripts/A
rm
ed F
orce 
 
 
-0.00098** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.00042) 
 
 
 
 
C
onscripts/L
abor F
orce 
 
 
 
-0.131*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.0168) 
 
 
 
A
rm
ed F
orce/L
abor F
orce 
 
 
 
 
-0.129*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.0140) 
 
 
L
ength 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0105*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.00207) 
 
M
ilitary 
E
xpenditure/G
D
P
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.000968*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.000169) 
C
onstant 
11.38*** 
11.53*** 
11.48*** 
11.49*** 
11.66*** 
11.62*** 
11.55*** 
 
(0.174) 
(0.183) 
(0.174) 
(0.160) 
(0.159) 
(0.169) 
(0.195) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O
bservations 
629 
629 
627 
627 
625 
628 
461 
R
-squared 
0.610 
0.614 
0.614 
0.646 
0.656 
0.628 
0.589 
F
-stat 
215.1 
189.3 
193.4 
295 
255.9 
225.9 
111.4 
N
ote: *(**)[***] denotes significance at the 10%
, (5%
), [1%
] level; robust standard errors in parentheses
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By adding the inflation rate as a control variable, Table 4 reports the results of the income 
equation for specification II. The coefficients on population growth rate and education still 
have the expected signs, and are always significant. The coefficients on investment are 
estimated to be mostly positive though insignificant in columns (1) to (6), while in column (7) 
the coefficient is estimated to be negative. The coefficient on the inflation rate is found to be 
negative, as economic theory predicts, and is always significant. The coefficients on conflicts 
are positive, and mostly significant except in columns (5) and (7). 
 
Few things change in the coefficients of the conscription variables once inflation is added: 
The coefficients on the conscript dummy and conscripts/armed force change signs, although 
their coefficients are insignificant (columns (2) and (3)), while Length remains negative but 
loses significance at conventional confidence levels (column (6)).  
 
Among the remaining three negative and significant coefficients, the largest is the share of 
armed personnel to the labor force (column (5)), a 10% increase of which reduces GDP per 
unit of the labor force by more than 0.7%. The second largest effect is from the share of 
conscripts to the labor force (column (4)), a 10% increase of which depresses GDP per labor 
force by more than 0.5%. The coefficient on the ratio of military expenditure to GDP has the 
smallest negative and significant coefficient under Specification II, a 10% increase in military 
expenditure decreases GDP per labor force by 0.005% ceteris paribus. 
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T
able 4: Incom
e L
evels under S
pecification II 
 
 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
Investm
ent 
0.002991 
0.003 
0.00293 
0.00269 
0.00119 
0.00286 
-0.00577 
 
(0.00306) 
(0.00306) 
(0.0031) 
(0.00301) 
(0.00296) 
(0.0030) 
(0.00426) 
P
opulation G
row
th +
0.05 
-0.2040*** 
-0.2038*** 
-0.1958*** 
-0.2130*** 
-0.2190*** 
-0.2154*** 
-0.1784*** 
 
(0.03228) 
(0.0341) 
(0.03385) 
(0.03164) 
(0.03152) 
(0.03299) 
(0.03953) 
E
ducation 
0.220*** 
0.220*** 
0.222*** 
0.209*** 
0.206*** 
0.213*** 
0.227*** 
 
(0.0153) 
(0.0156) 
(0.0156) 
(0.0157) 
(0.0154) 
(0.0155) 
(0.0191) 
C
onflict 
0.0496** 
0.0496** 
0.0532** 
0.0402* 
0.0366 
0.0499** 
0.0364 
 
(0.0246) 
(0.0249) 
(0.0252) 
(0.0244) 
(0.0240) 
(0.0247) 
(0.0276) 
Inflation 
-0.01748*** 
-0.01748*** 
-0.01806*** 
-0.01502*** 
-0.01415*** 
-0.01680*** 
-0.01432*** 
 
(0.00190) 
(0.00194) 
(0.00202) 
(0.00192) 
(0.00179) 
(0.00198) 
(0.00192) 
C
onscript D
V
 
 
0.000643 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.0258) 
 
 
 
 
 
C
onscripts/A
rm
ed F
orce 
 
 
0.000464 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.000394) 
 
 
 
 
C
onscripts/L
abor F
orce 
 
 
 
-0.0578*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.0180) 
 
 
 
A
rm
ed F
orce/L
abor F
orce 
 
 
 
 
-0.0760*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.0136) 
 
 
L
ength 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.00303 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.00216) 
 
M
ilitary E
xpenditure/G
D
P
M
ilitary E
xpenditure/G
D
P
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.000512*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.000153) 
C
onstant 
10.96*** 
10.96*** 
10.90*** 
11.08*** 
11.22*** 
11.07*** 
11.08*** 
 
(0.160) 
(0.180) 
(0.172) 
(0.165) 
(0.165) 
(0.174) 
(0.187) 
O
bservations 
620 
620 
618 
618 
616 
619 
460 
R
-squared 
0.682 
0.682 
0.683 
0.687 
0.695 
0.685 
0.636 
F
-stat 
257.2 
214.2 
205.2 
283.3 
284 
228.3 
203.7 
N
ote: *(**)[***] denotes significance at the 10%
, (5%
), [1%
] level; robust standard errors in parentheses 
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As Table 2 shows, the inflation rate is positively and significantly correlated with all 
military variables. Once inflation is added as a control variable, three of six military variables 
lose their significance, with two of them changing signs. One possible explanation might be 
due to omitted variable bias. Since I do not have data on alternative military service, the 
conscription dummy is likely to capture some of the effect of alternative service. The effects 
of alternative service are argued by Keller et al. (2009) to be negative, following the same 
logic of differences in comparative advantages. Among the 21 OECD countries that use 
conscription, most of them also offer alternative service to conscientious objectors. The 
positive sign of conscript DV in column (2) in Table 4 might somehow capture some  
(positive) effects from alternative service in the public and social sectors, once inflation is 
controlled for. Furthermore, inflation can perhaps be seen as a proxy for deadweight loss in 
taxation, as argued by Keller et al. (2009). Countries with higher inflation may be less able to 
staff armed force adequately with professional soldiers, and may thus be more prone to 
conscription. (Table 2 shows positive and significant correlation between inflation rates and 
all the conscription variables.) However, given the rather homogenous sample of developed 
countries, the argument that higher inflation implies more deadweight loss in taxation and 
thus more intense conscription use, may not apply. Another possible explanation is the time 
horizon. The decrease in the ratio of conscripted soldiers to total armed force happened only 
after 1990, as Figure 3 shows. It might be that two decades are not enough to fully exhibit the 
effects of the intensity of conscription in terms of the share of conscripts to the armed force, 
as in column (3) of Table 4.  
31 
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T
able 5: Incom
e L
evels under S
pecification III 
 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
Investm
ent 
0.00205 
0.00257 
0.00266 
0.00203 
0.00154 
0.00208 
0.00416*** 
 
(0.00168) 
(0.00168) 
(0.00172) 
(0.00169) 
(0.00158) 
(0.0017) 
(0.00159) 
P
opulation G
row
th+
 0.05 
0.03518* 
0.03807** 
0.04036** 
0.03530** 
0.03113* 
0.03522* 
0.03054* 
 
(0.0180) 
(0.01747) 
(0.01758) 
(0.01797) 
(0.01672) 
(0.01798) 
(0.01804) 
E
ducation 
0.164*** 
0.173*** 
0.177*** 
0.161*** 
0.109*** 
0.166*** 
0.102*** 
 
(0.0156) 
(0.0186) 
(0.0206) 
(0.0219) 
(0.0162) 
(0.0185) 
(0.0252) 
C
onflict 
0.0783*** 
0.0830*** 
0.0819*** 
0.0774*** 
0.0648*** 
0.0796*** 
0.0485*** 
 
(0.0129) 
(0.0128) 
(0.0128) 
(0.0123) 
(0.00937) 
(0.0124) 
(0.0113) 
Inflation 
-0.00676*** 
-0.00664*** 
-0.00692*** 
-0.00667*** 
-0.00502*** 
-0.00682*** 
-0.00387*** 
 
(0.00105) 
(0.00107) 
(0.00107) 
(0.00106) 
(0.000832) 
(0.00105) 
(0.000793) 
C
onscript D
V
 
 
0.0586** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.0232) 
 
 
 
 
 
C
onscripts/A
rm
ed F
orce 
 
 
0.000928* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.000484) 
 
 
 
 
C
onscripts/L
abor F
orce 
 
 
 
-0.00830 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.0243) 
 
 
 
A
rm
ed F
orce/L
abor F
orce 
 
 
 
 
-0.115*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.0189) 
 
 
L
ength 
 
 
 
 
 
0.000788 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.00181) 
 
M
ilitary E
xpenditure/G
D
P
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.00114*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.000156) 
C
onstant 
9.854*** 
9.777*** 
9.959*** 
9.350*** 
9.595*** 
9.842*** 
10.28*** 
 
(0.111) 
(0.120) 
(0.100) 
(0.103) 
(0.104) 
(0.123) 
(0.137) 
O
bservations 
620 
620 
618 
618 
616 
619 
460 
R
-squared 
0.957 
0.958 
0.957 
0.957 
0.963 
0.957 
0.977 
F
-stat 
625.6 
592.2 
563.3 
629.3 
706.3 
592.8 
1497.4 
N
ote: *(**)[***] denotes significance at the 10%
, (5%
), [1%
] level; robust standard errors in parentheses
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Table 5 introduces country fixed effects in to the previous regression model. When doing 
so we observe that the coefficients on investment always have the expected positive signs, 
with the coefficients being significant in all cases except column (7). The coefficients on 
inflation and education not only always have the expected signs, but are also always 
significant. Notably, the coefficients of population growth rate and the presence of conflicts 
are all significantly positive, once country fixed effects are added to the specification.   
 
   When adding country fixed effects, enforcing conscription has positive and significant 
effects in terms of the conscription dummy (column (2)) and the share of conscripts to armed 
force (column (3)). Having a conscription system increases GDP per unit of the labor force by 
more than 0.05% (significant at the 5% level), and a 10% increase in the share of conscripts to 
the armed force increases GDP per unit of the labor force by 0.009% (significant at the 10% 
level).  
  The more general military variables, i.e. the relative size of the armed forces to the labor 
force, and the relative share of military expenditure to GDP, both remain negative and 
significant at the 1% level (columns (5) and (7)). 
  Compared with the results from a similar specification in Keller et al. (2009), Table 5 shows 
a number of differences. In the paper of Keller et al (2009) all estimated coefficients on the 
conscription variables are negative, and mostly significant. Moreover, the coefficient on the 
share of military expenditure to GDP is estimated to have almost no effect on income levels. 
The new variable I add, the share of conscripts to the armed force is estimated to be negative 
yet insignificant at conventional confidence levels.  
 
  One explanation for the positive signs and significance of the coefficients on the conscript 
dummy and the share of conscripts to armed force could be that by adding country fixed 
effects, the omitted variable issues are removed to a certain extent, and the country specific 
characteristics are captured. The effects of enforcing conscription seem to be mixed and hard 
to explain once country fixed effects are added to the estimation. 
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T
able 6: Incom
e L
evels under S
pecification IV
 
 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
Investm
ent 
0.00659*** 
0.00785*** 
0.00776*** 
0.00790*** 
0.00867*** 
0.00769*** 
0.00828*** 
 
(0.00136) 
(0.00131) 
(0.00133) 
(0.00136) 
(0.00139) 
(0.00140) 
(0.00149) 
P
opulation G
row
th+
0.05 
0.00774 
0.01123 
0.01700 
0.00312 
0.00409 
0.00705 
0.02233* 
 
(0.01187) 
(0.01089) 
(0.01128) 
(0.01122) 
(0.01124) 
(0.0112) 
(0.01.17) 
E
ducation 
0.00228 
0.0124* 
0.0213*** 
0.0192** 
0.0118 
0.0122* 
-0.00556 
 
(0.00760) 
(0.00654) 
(0.00667) 
(0.00750) 
(0.00719) 
(0.00652) 
(0.0119) 
C
onflict 
-0.0103 
-0.00567 
-0.00608 
-0.0110 
-0.00925 
-0.00605 
-0.0155** 
 
(0.00750) 
(0.00697) 
(0.00689) 
(0.00737) 
(0.00709) 
(0.00704) 
(0.00724) 
Inflation 
-0.00244*** 
-0.00214*** 
-0.00268*** 
-0.00299*** 
-0.00248*** 
-0.00270*** 
-0.00305*** 
 
(0.00067) 
(0.000632) 
(0.00667) 
(0.000756) 
(0.000711) 
(0.000657) 
(0.000573) 
C
onscript D
V
 
 
0.0950*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.00988) 
 
 
 
 
 
C
onscripts/A
rm
ed F
orce 
 
 
0.00181*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.000243) 
 
 
 
 
C
onscripts/L
abor F
orce 
 
 
 
0.0571*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.0138) 
 
 
 
A
rm
ed F
orce/L
abor F
orce 
 
 
 
 
0.0465*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.0110) 
 
 
L
ength 
 
 
 
 
 
0.00582*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.000978) 
 
M
ilitary E
xpenditure/G
D
P
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.000116 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.000103) 
C
onstant 
10.58*** 
10.47*** 
10.40*** 
10.50*** 
9.308*** 
10.51*** 
9.348*** 
 
(0.0773) 
(0.0717) 
(0.0770) 
(0.0807) 
(0.0785) 
(0.0747) 
(0.0928) 
O
bservations 
620 
620 
618 
618 
616 
619 
460 
R
-squared 
0.984 
0.986 
0.986 
0.985 
0.986 
0.985 
0.990 
F
-stat 
823.3 
925.7 
834.9 
742.8 
758.6 
805.8 
1223.67 
N
ote: *(**)[***] denotes significance at the 10%
, (5%
), [1%
] level; robust standard errors in parentheses 
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       Table 6 reports the results of the income regressions under specification IV, where time 
dummies are additionally included in the model. Inflation rates are always found to have a 
negative and significant effect on the income level (significant at the 1% level), and 
investment always has a positive and significant effect (at the 1% level). The presence of 
conflicts has mostly negative and insignificant effects, while population growth rates have a 
positive and mostly insignificant effect when year fixed effects are added.  All the coefficients 
on military variables become positive and highly significant (at 1%) in specification IV, 
except for the share of military expenditure to GDP which is negative and insignificant.  
      Year fixed effects control for time-specific heterogeneity (i.e. world business cycles). 
They are also likely to capture the impacts of technological and organizational improvements 
in the military sector (and elsewhere), developments in military strategy, the advent of 
military adventurism and joint missions, and historical events, etc. Surprisingly, when adding 
year fixed effects, all the conscription variables are estimated to be positive and significant. 
This is difficult to explain with the classic economic theory of comparative advantages alone. 
Further research on the relationships between these time-specific impacts and conscription 
should shed more light on the effects of conscription on income levels. 
 
 
Table 7: Summary of Income Regression Results 
 I II III IV 
Conscript DV - ** + + ** + *** 
Conscripts/Ar
med Force 
- ** + + ** + *** 
Conscripts/Lab
or Force 
- *** - *** - + *** 
Armed 
Force/Labor 
Force 
- *** - *** -*** + *** 
Length - *** - + + *** 
Military 
Expenditure/G
DP 
- *** - *** - *** - 
 
  In Table 7, I report the signs and significance levels of the military variables from all four 
specifications. Looking at the columns from left to right, one can see that deviating from the 
augmented Solow model by adding more control variables, and in particular when adding 
country and time fixed effects, the conscription variables lose their significance, and usually 
change signs from negative to positive. Only under specification I are all conscription and 
35 
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military variables negative and significant.  
 
4.2 G rowth Rates 
 
This section reports results from OLS regressions estimating Equation (2). In my analysis 
I use data on annual growth rates, whereas Keller et al. (2009) use decadal average growth 
rates. To estimate Equation (2), one needs to account for the initial income level. Keller et al. 
(2009) use the GDP per capita in 1960 as a regressor in their growth estimations. One 
problem with the initial per capita GDP term is that it is not possible to estimate the 
coefficient on this variable when country fixed effects. In order to compare results across the 
different specifications therefore I choose to drop the initial per capita GDP term in all 
models. Time-invariant, country-specific factors – such as the initial income term – will be 
captured by the country fixed-effects in specifications III and IV however.  
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T
able 8: G
row
th under S
pecification I 
 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
Investm
ent 
0.1331*** 
0.1329*** 
0.1230*** 
0.1227*** 
0.1229*** 
0.1229*** 
0.1794*** 
 
(0.02263) 
(0.02268) 
(0.02674) 
(0.02966) 
(0.03006) 
(0.02304) 
(0.04119) 
P
opulation G
row
th+
0.05 
-0.356* 
-0.3946** 
-0.4415* 
-0.2663 
-0.3244 
-0.2059 
-0.4334 
 
(0.1928) 
(0.1977) 
(0.2307) 
(0.2153) 
(0.2284) 
(0.1862) 
(0.2804) 
E
ducation 
-0.376*** 
-0.420*** 
-0.211** 
-0.241** 
-0.174 
-0.299*** 
-0.232* 
 
(0.0786) 
(0.0809) 
(0.0927) 
(0.112) 
(0.126) 
(0.0817) 
(0.140) 
C
onflict 
-0.356* 
-0.382* 
-0.533** 
-0.602*** 
-0.565** 
-0.427** 
-0.856*** 
 
(0.203) 
(0.206) 
(0.221) 
(0.226) 
(0.225) 
(0.200) 
(0.227) 
C
onscript D
V
 
 
-0.263 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.195) 
 
 
 
 
 
C
onscripts/A
rm
ed F
orce 
 
 
-0.00595* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.00322) 
 
 
 
 
C
onscripts/L
abor F
orce 
 
 
 
-0.179 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.159) 
 
 
 
A
rm
ed F
orce/L
abor F
orce 
 
 
 
 
-0.0345 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.146) 
 
 
L
ength 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0153 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.0145) 
 
M
ilitary E
xpenditure/G
D
P
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.00182 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.00138) 
C
onstant 
2.407** 
2.947** 
2.631** 
1.663 
1.683 
1.413 
1.100 
 
(1.115) 
(1.226) 
(1.199) 
(1.162) 
(1.251) 
(1.075) 
(1.464) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O
bservations 
880 
880 
778 
635 
624 
859 
480 
R
-squared 
0.112 
0.113 
0.076 
0.068 
0.064 
0.098 
0.110 
F
-stat 
21.78 
17.67 
9.496 
7.934 
7.343 
15.04 
11.25 
N
ote: *(**)[***] denotes significance at the 10%
, (5%
), [1%
] level; robust standard errors in parentheses
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Table 8 reports results from growth regressions under specification I. The coefficients on 
population growth and investment have the expected signs, negative and positive respectively, 
though the coefficients on population growth are not significant in column (4) to (7). 
Education has surprisingly all negative and significant coefficients, though this has been 
found else where (Angrist and Krueger (1991), and Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), Gemmell 
(1996) Krueger and Lindahl (2001), and Pritchett (2011)). The conflict variable is found to 
have a consistently negative and significant effects in specification I. 
The coefficients on the conscript dummy, the share of conscripts to the labor force, and 
the share of armed force to the labor force are all negative, but not significant at conventional 
levels (column (2), (4), and (5)). The coefficients on length and on the share of military 
expenditure to GDP are positive and insignificant (column (6) and (7)). In fact, the only 
significant coefficient amongst the military variables is the share of conscripts to the total 
armed force (column (3)), with a coefficient of -0.00595 that is significant at the 10% level. In 
this specification, a 10% increase in the share of conscripts to total armed force depresses 
economic growth by around 0.006%, holding all constant. 
 
When adding the inflation rate (Table 9), the signs of the coefficients on investment, 
population growth and the presence of conflicts are as expected. The coefficients on education 
continue to have the negative signs, and are always significant. The presence of conflicts have 
mostly negative and significant effects on the GDP growth rates per capita, holding all else 
constant.  
The only significant military variable in specification II is the length of conscription, with 
a coefficient of 0.0262 (significant at the 10% level in column (6)). A one month increase in 
the duration of conscription increases GDP growth rate per capita by 0.0262%, holding all 
else constant. The coefficient on the share of conscripts in total armed force is still negative, 
but loses significance when the inflation rate is added to the regression. 
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T
able 9: G
row
th under S
pecification II 
 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
Investm
ent 
0.1408*** 
0.1400*** 
0.1220*** 
0.1247*** 
0.1271*** 
0.1316*** 
0.1819*** 
 
(0.02157) 
(0.02161) 
(0.02680) 
(0.02982) 
(0.03034) 
(0.02177) 
(0.04181) 
P
opulation G
row
th+
0.05 
-0.1034 
-0.1413 
-0.1749 
-0.07023 
-0.09.564 
1.099 
-0.33.53 
 
(0.2124) 
(0.2231) 
(0.2920) 
(0.2442) 
(0.2490) 
(0.1988) 
(0.3006) 
E
ducation 
-0.577*** 
-0.610*** 
-0.315** 
-0.297** 
-0.254* 
-0.475*** 
-0.280* 
 
(0.0901) 
(0.0947) 
(0.125) 
(0.136) 
(0.147) 
(0.0935) 
(0.160) 
Inflation 
-0.06118*** 
-0.06040*** 
-0.03317 
-0.02389 
-0.02663 
-0.06706*** 
-0.01207 
 
(0.01808) 
(0.01814) 
(0.02259) 
(0.02650) 
(0.02536) 
(0.01841) 
(0.02737) 
C
onflict 
-0.259 
-0.266 
-0.515** 
-0.608*** 
-0.573** 
-0.368* 
-0.845*** 
 
(0.210) 
(0.211) 
(0.223) 
(0.231) 
(0.229) 
(0.203) 
(0.229) 
C
onscript D
V
 
 
-0.187 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.208) 
 
 
 
 
 
C
onscripts/A
rm
ed F
orce 
 
 
-0.00300 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.00350) 
 
 
 
 
C
onscripts/L
abor F
orce 
 
 
 
-0.0330 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.191) 
 
 
 
A
rm
ed F
orce/L
abor F
orce 
 
 
 
 
0.0784 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.163) 
 
 
L
ength 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0262* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.0144) 
 
M
ilitary E
xpenditure/G
D
P
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.00208 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.00138) 
C
onstant 
1.789 
2.246 
1.585 
0.745 
0.574 
0.287 
0.662 
 
(1.218) 
(1.402) 
(1.359) 
(1.243) 
(1.319) 
(1.164) 
(1.529) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O
bservations 
862 
862 
760 
626 
615 
841 
479 
R
-squared 
0.142 
0.142 
0.085 
0.073 
0.071 
0.135 
0.111 
F
-stat 
22.37 
18.75 
8.876 
6.858 
6.421 
17.01 
9.335 
N
ote: *(**)[***] denotes significance at the 10%
, (5%
), [1%
] level; robust standard errors in parentheses 
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T
able 10: G
row
th under S
pecification III 
 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
Investm
ent 
0.3361*** 
0.3411*** 
0.3508*** 
0.4058*** 
0.4064*** 
0.3362*** 
0.4746*** 
 
(0.03226) 
(0.03244) 
(0.03429) 
(0.04224) 
(0.04427) 
(0.03285) 
(0.05618) 
P
opulation G
row
th+
0.05 
-1.541*** 
-1.530*** 
-1.516*** 
-2.013*** 
-2.037*** 
-1.492*** 
-2.615*** 
 
(0.2040) 
(0.2042) 
(0.2289) 
(0.2603) 
(0.2691) 
(0.2514) 
(0.2834) 
E
ducation 
-0.503*** 
-0.418*** 
0.0272 
0.217 
-0.0816 
-0.269** 
-0.485 
 
(0.114) 
(0.125) 
(0.164) 
(0.258) 
(0.267) 
(0.137) 
(0.371) 
Inflation 
-0.1373*** 
-0.1376*** 
-0.1375*** 
-0.1298*** 
-0.1187*** 
-0.1398*** 
-0.06241 
 
(0.01831) 
(0.01829) 
(0.02576) 
(0.03062) 
(0.03261) 
(0.01861) 
(0.04029) 
C
onflict 
-0.521*** 
-0.529*** 
-0.737*** 
-0.878*** 
-0.860*** 
-0.660*** 
-1.035*** 
 
(0.198) 
(0.197) 
(0.211) 
(0.221) 
(0.225) 
(0.197) 
(0.243) 
C
onscript D
V
 
 
0.509* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.291) 
 
 
 
 
 
C
onscripts/A
rm
ed F
orce 
 
 
0.0189*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.00678) 
 
 
 
 
C
onscripts/L
abor F
orce 
 
 
 
0.957** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.411) 
 
 
 
A
rm
ed F
orce/L
abor F
orce 
 
 
 
 
0.242 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.377) 
 
 
L
ength 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0544*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.0179) 
 
M
ilitary E
xpenditure/G
D
P
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.00747** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.00319) 
C
onstant 
4.015*** 
2.978** 
4.637*** 
1.263 
3.647 
5.519*** 
12.45*** 
 
(1.270) 
(1.386) 
(1.322) 
(2.287) 
(2.724) 
(1.297) 
(1.780) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O
bservations 
862 
862 
760 
626 
615 
841 
479 
R
-squared 
0.309 
0.310 
0.280 
0.283 
0.282 
0.301 
0.334 
F
-stat 
11.87 
11.57 
8.843 
7.645 
6.725 
10.63 
7.956 
N
ote: *(**)[***] denotes significance at the 10%
, (5%
), [1%
] level; robust standard errors in parentheses
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In Table 10 country fixed effects are added as control variables. The coefficients on 
investment, the population growth rates, and the inflation rates have the expected signs and 
mostly significant. The ceteris paribus effect of average years in secondary schooling is 
mixed, and not always significant, with positive signs found in column (3) and (4). Notably 
the presence of conflicts has a consistently negative and significant effect on growth rates. 
 
 All the coefficients on conscription variables are positive, and most of them are 
significant except for the share of armed force to the labor force. The largest positive effect 
among the conscription variables is the share of conscripts in the labor force (column (6)), 
with results indicating that a 1% increase in its share increases GDP per capita growth rate by 
0.957% . The second largest positive effect among the significant conscription variable is the 
conscript dummy (column (2)), if a country enforces conscription, its GDP per capita growth 
rate increases by 0.509% compared with the scenario where it employs a fully volunteer 
armed force.  
 
When country fixed effects are included the coefficient on military expenditure/GDP 
becomes negative and significant (column (7)). A 10% increase in the share of military 
expenditure to GDP decreases per capita GDP growth rate by 0.07%. 
 
It appears that by adding country fixed effects, and thereby taking initial income levels 
and other country-specific, time invariant factors into account, conscription variables have a 
positive effect on economic growth. 
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T
able 11: G
row
th under S
pecification IV
 
 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
Investm
ent 
0.2784*** 
0.2778*** 
0.2877*** 
0.2971*** 
0.2978*** 
0.2828*** 
0.3436*** 
 
(0.02895) 
(0.02938) 
(0.03188) 
(0.03952) 
(0.04061) 
(0.02975) 
(0.05992) 
P
opulation G
row
th+
0.05 
-1.282*** 
-1.282*** 
-0.9785*** 
-1.368*** 
-1.365*** 
-1.137*** 
-1.745*** 
 
(0.1884) 
(0.1884) 
(0.2360) 
(0.2465) 
(0.2498) 
(0.2226) 
(0.2892) 
E
ducation 
-0.177 
-0.181 
-0.148 
0.0264 
-0.116 
-0.198 
-0.647** 
 
(0.177) 
(0.173) 
(0.178) 
(0.248) 
(0.238) 
(0.159) 
(0.272) 
Inflation 
-0.1100*** 
-0.1099*** 
-0.1323*** 
-0.1230*** 
-0.1166*** 
-0.1133*** 
-0.08725*** 
 
(0.02102) 
(0.02104) 
(0.02422) 
(0.02824) 
(0.02811) 
(0.0210) 
(0.03277) 
C
onflict 
0.0906 
0.0944 
0.0203 
0.0890 
0.103 
-0.128 
-0.191 
 
(0.207) 
(0.205) 
(0.214) 
(0.223) 
(0.219) 
(0.204) 
(0.254) 
C
onscript D
V
 
 
-0.0442 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.234) 
 
 
 
 
 
C
onscripts/A
rm
ed F
orce 
 
 
0.0155*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.00567) 
 
 
 
 
C
onscripts/L
abor F
orce 
 
 
 
0.650* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.358) 
 
 
 
A
rm
ed F
orce/L
abor F
orce 
 
 
 
 
0.490 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.360) 
 
 
L
ength 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0139 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.0189) 
 
M
ilitary E
xpenditure/G
D
P
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.000325 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.00324) 
C
onstant 
4.393* 
4.475* 
1.197 
2.458 
1.178 
9.540** 
11.88*** 
 
(2.510) 
(2.596) 
(1.459) 
(2.050) 
(2.403) 
(3.721) 
(2.058) 
O
bservations 
862 
862 
760 
626 
615 
841 
479 
R
-squared 
0.540 
0.540 
0.540 
0.560 
0.556 
0.541 
0.607 
F
-stat 
11.80 
11.89 
. 
. 
11.37 
11.19 
13.09 
N
ote: *(**)[***] denotes significance at the 10%
, (5%
), [1%
] level; robust standard errors in parentheses
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Table 11 adds year fixed effects. The coefficients on investment, population growth rate, 
and the inflation rate have the expected signs and are always significant in this specification. 
The coefficients on education are mostly negative, with the exception of column (5). The 
coefficients on the presence of conflicts all have positive signs but are insignificant in Table 
11.  
The coefficient on the conscript dummy changes sign when year fixed effects are added, 
but is insignificant (column (2)). The coefficients on the share of armed force to the labor 
force and the length of conscription (column (5) and (6)) are still positive but lose their 
significance when year fixed effects are controlled for. The coefficient on the share of 
conscripts to the labor force (column (5)) is still positive and significant, but is smaller 
compared with that in specification III (with a coefficient of 0.957). When year fixed effects 
are added, a 1% increase in the share of conscripts to the labor force increase GDP per capita 
growth rate by 0.65%. 
 
Table 12 Summary of Growth Regression Results: 
 I II III IV 
Conscript DV -  - + * - 
Conscripts/Ar
med Force 
-  * - + *** + *** 
Conscripts/Lab
or Force 
-  - + ** + * 
Armed 
Force/Labor 
Force 
-  + + +  
Length + + * + *** +  
Military 
Expenditure/G
DP 
+ + - ** - 
 
I summarize the signs and significance levels of the growth regressions in Table 12. In 
general, military and conscription variables exhibit mixed signs. In the first two 
specifications, most of the conscription variables are estimated to be negative, although rarely 
significant. Adding country fixed effects, the conscription variables show positive and 
statistically significant effects on economic growth. In specification IV, most of the 
conscription variables remain positive except for the conscript dummy, with only 
conscripts/labor force remains significant. It is to be noted that the duration of conscription 
spell remains positive in all four specifications, although not always significant.  
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Specification III and IV are the most likely candidates for estimation of Equation (2) in 
my growth regressions, because country fixed effects should capture differences in initial 
GDPs. Comparing the summary results from specification III and IV, most conscription 
variables lose their significance, with the conscript dummy changing its sign. Interestingly, all 
the conscription variables are estimated to be positive and significant in specification III. It is 
puzzling and difficult to explain these results with only the classic theories which suggest that 
conscription hampers economic growth. Furthermore, even though I use the same 21 OECD 
countries as Keller et al. (2009), I do not find consistently negative and significant effects of 
conscription on economic growth as they do.  
It seems that when fixed effects are added, conscription has a positive though not always 
significant effect on economic growth. By adding fixed effects, the problem of omitted 
variables (i.e. alternative service) should be removed to a certain extent, yet the results from 
specification III and IV still present the unexpected positive effect of conscription. 
 
4.3 Sensitivity Test 
 
An important issue related to my analysis is that the use of conscription may be an 
endogenous variable. Warner and Ash (1996), Warner and Negrusa (2005) and Mulligan and 
Shleifer (2005) aim at explaining why some countries use conscription and some rely on 
professional armed force. More precisely, they are interested in whether there is reverse 
causality from income to conscription.  
It could be that richer countries do not use conscription, while poorer countries cannot 
afford a fully professional armed force. However, Mulligan and Shleifer (2005) do not find 
any statistical significance for an impact of a country’s per-capita income on the choice of 
military recruitment system. They argue that the choice of conscription might be correlated 
with a high administrative burden that is to be found with a French civil-law legal origin.  
Keller et al. (2009) test for Granger causality in their cross-country results to investigate 
the possibility of reverse causality. The null hypothesis of no Granger causality cannot be 
rejected at the 5% confidence level for many countries. More specifically, the results are 
mixed. For some countries (Austria, France, and Greece), the length of conscription and the 
share of conscripts in the labor force Granger cause growth. In Sweden, income Granger 
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causes the share of conscripts in the labor force, and growth Granger causes the duration of 
conscription.  
As for my results, since the conscription variables are neither consistently negative, as the 
theory of comparative advantage suggest, nor are they consistently negative and significant as 
in Keller et al. (2009), I do not test for Granger causality by country. Instead, I conduct least 
absolute value (LAV), or least absolute deviation estimation, to reduce the influence of 
potential outliers. To do this, I check the results from quantile regressions for all the income 
and growth estimations, and then compare the signs and significance levels of military 
variables with the OLS results reported in the section above. 
By and large, most of the coefficients from LAV and OLS share the same signs and 
significance with few exceptions. The major exceptions are that in the income regression 
under specification II, military expenditure/GDP  is positive and insignificant in OLS, but 
negative and highly significant in LAV, while in the growth regression under Specification 
IV, the conscript dummy is insignificantly negative in OLS and significantly positive in LAV 
at 1% level.  
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5 Conclusion 
 
 
The effect of military conscription on economic performance is predicted to be associated 
with static inefficiencies as well as with dynamic distortions of human and physical capital. 
Examining panel data from 21 OECD countries from 1960 to 2010 shows however 
inconsistent results, especially when fixed effects are added.       
Military conscription is measured by the conscription dummy variable, the share of 
conscripts to the armed force, the share of conscripts in the labor force and the length of 
service time. To see the effects of more general military sector, the relative size of the armed 
force to the labor force and the relative size of military expenditure to GDP are also added. 
To control for the demand for military output I include a conflict variable, which is a 
dummy variable and takes the value one if a country is involved in domestic or international 
conflict. The ceteris paribus effect of this variable is mixed. On income levels, which are 
measured by GDP per unit of labor force, the coefficient of conflict is estimated to be mostly 
zero, and sometimes significantly positive. Whereas on growth rates, which is the GDP per 
capita growth rate, the coefficient of conflict is mostly significant and negative, and only 
rarely zero. 
The more general military variables, namely the share of military spending to GDP and 
the share of military personnel to the labor force, have more consistent ceteris paribus effects 
in my regressions. The relative size of the armed force to the labor force always receives the 
negative sign in income regressions, and is always significant at the 1% level, whereas in 
growth regressions it is estimated to have no effect. The coefficient of the ratio of military 
expenditure to GDP is estimated to have negative and significant effects on income levels, 
and has mixed results in growth regressions. In the literature on defense economics, military 
spending has pretty mixed effects on economic growth. The relative size of the armed force, 
however, has not yet been extensively considered. My results suggest that in OECD countries, 
the larger the share of the labor force working in the military sector, the lower the income 
levels are, holding all else constant.  
The ceteris paribus effects of conscription variables on income levels (GDP per unit of 
labor force) and economic growth (GDP per capita growth rate) are not consistently negative 
when country and year fixed effects are included in the regressions. Compared with the 
consistently negative and significant results of Keller et al. (2009), this is much of a surprise.  
Among the conscription variables, the share of conscripts to the labor force is one of the 
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particular interests in this thesis. According to the computational general equilibrium by Lau 
et al. (2004), the larger this share is, the more it depresses the income level from its steady 
state level. In my income panel results, this variable is estimated to be negative and 
significant only without fixed effects. One needs to note that, in the work of Lau et al. (2004), 
supplementary tax rates are part of the determinants of the equilibrium outcomes. In my 
simple regression models, tax rates are not included.  
Another conscription variable of special interest in this thesis is the share of conscripts to 
the armed force personnel. The larger this share is, the more negative effects it should have on 
economic performance according to the mainstream economic theory on conscription. This 
variable is supposed to measure directly the dyad of conscripts-all volunteer force. In my 
results, this variable is only estimated to be negative and significant without inflation and 
fixed effects. When fixed effects are added, its coefficient become positive and significant 
(for both income and growth regressions). 
The expected negative effects, due to ignorance of comparative advantage among 
conscripts and the accompanying opportunity costs, vanish when country and year fixed 
effects are added. This is difficult to explain, yet I summarize possible explanations and ideas 
for future research: 
 
1. Time Horizon. Given the relative young movement of abolishment of conscription in 
Europe, which starts in 1990, it is likely that two decades are not enough to reflect the true 
effects of the intensity of conscription, i.e., the share of conscripts to the armed force and to 
the labor force, and the length of compulsory military service.  
 
2. Space Horizon. Although the political disputes of conscription occur mainly in OECD 
countries, the relationship between conscription and economic performance is also interesting 
for developing countries and rest of the world. A wider sample can shed more light on the 
subject. 
 
3. Omitted Variable Bias:  
i.) Alternative service is argued to depress economic performance in the same way as 
compulsory military service. There is no time-series data of the intensity and length of 
alternative service, therefore the conscription dummy variable may capture some of the 
effects from alternative service, which might be more valuable to society as mainstream 
economic theory predicts.  
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ii.) Taxation. To finance an all-volunteer armed force, government needs to rely on more 
taxation than relying on military conscription. The allocative aspect of taxation may be 
influencing the economic effects of conscription.  Poutvaara and Wagener (2005) argues that 
the abolishment of military conscription may bring Pareto-improvement to the society if 
generation-specific tax can be enforced, more specifically, on the young generations, however 
this is rather infeasible. They also show that the introduction of conscription benefits the older 
generations while harming the younger and future generations, and abolishment of 
conscription without generation-specific taxation would not necessary mean Pareto 
improvement for the society. These inter-generational aspects of Pareto efficiency may help to 
explain the unexpected signs of conscription variables in my results. 
 
3. Specification of regression models. Perhaps the relationship between the conscription 
variables and economic performance may be non-linear, just as defense spending is argued to 
be non-linear to economic growth by Hooker (1997), Heo (1998), and Heckelman (2001). For 
future research, quadratic relationships, for example, should be considered. It could be that 
conscription is beneficial to economic performance to a certain degree, with some turning 
point percentage which measures the intensity of conscription, such as the share of population 
serving in the compulsory service to the labor force or armed personnel. 
 
4. Difficulty to separate other determining effects. For example, the advent of internet, the 
fall of communism, the rise of military adventurism, the development in military technology, 
etc. The new landscape for the military sector can be determinant in the relationship between 
conscription and economic performance as well.  
 
   To conclude, examining panel data from 21 OECD countries, conscription does not have 
robust negative effects on economic performance, when fixed effects are added. The 
mainstream economic theory that favours an all-volunteer force due to ignorance of 
comparative advantage and increased opportunity costs cannot find full empirical support 
from my estimates. The effects of military conscription on economic performance still need to 
be further investigated. 
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Abstract 
 
 
 
Mainstream economic theory predicts that military conscription is associated with 
static inefficiencies and dynamic distortions of the accumulations of human and 
physical capital, relative to an all-volunteer force recruitment system.  
To examine the effect of conscription on economic performance, panel data from 21 
OECD countries is used. Surprisingly, the estimates do not always indicate negative 
influence of military conscription on economic performance, especially when fixed 
effects are accounted for. 
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K urzfassung  
 
 
Die klassische ökonomische Theorie besagt, dass im Vergleich zu einer Freiwilligenarmee 
eine Wehrpflicht sowohl mit statischer Ineffizienz als auch dynamischer Verzerrung der 
Human-, und Sachkapitalakkumulation assoziiert sei. 
 
Anhand von Paneldaten aus 21-OECD Staaten wird der Einfluss des Wehrdiensts auf die 
Wirtschaftsleistung geprüft. Überraschenderweise entsprechen die geschätzten Koeffizienten 
nicht immer dem negativen Einfluss des Wehrdiensts auf die Wirtschaftsleistung, den 
klassische Theorien prognostizieren, insbesondere dann, wenn Fixed Effects kontrolliert 
werden. 
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